The sharp distinction drawn between firms rated narrowly above (BBB-) and below (BB+) the investment-grade cutoff provides variation in debt financing availability unrelated to firm fundamentals. We exploit this market segmentation to identify an asymmetric effect of debt capital supply on corporate disclosure: BB+ firms step up voluntary disclosure in response to high-yield bond mutual fund outflows. This effect is concentrated in periods of large fund outflows and among financially constrained firms. Conditional on greater disclosure, these firms increase equity issuance. Thus, disclosure may alleviate information-based financing frictions, allowing firms to smooth out temporary disruptions to the availability of finance.
Introduction
Information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital has the potential to affect the financing capacity of firms funded with information-sensitive securities (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . If investors are not symmetrically informed market liquidity could deteriorate (Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) , particularly if retail investors are discouraged from market participation (Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012) . Ultimately, these frictions could lead to under-investment relative to the full information benchmark (Stein, 2003) .
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The goal of this paper is to understand whether firms' disclosure choices can alleviate information-based financing frictions, enabling more transparent firms have greater access to finance (Lambert et al., 2007; Verrecchia, 2001) . While this is a central question in finance and accounting, empirically identifying the causal relation between financial constraints and corporate disclosure has proven challenging. This is partly due to omitted variables problems whereby unobservable changes in firm fundamentals may jointly affect access to capital and corporate disclosure (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) .
We propose a solution to this endogeneity problem that measures how corporate disclosure responds to capital supply shocks that are plausibly exogenous to firm fundamentals.
Our tests exploit the credit ratings-based capital market segmentation between investmentand noninvestment-grade firms in conjunction with high-yield bond mutual fund flows [building on the approach of Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) ]. We rely on two stylized facts. First, credit ratings are coarse and slow-moving measures of credit quality (Altman and Kao, 1992; Cantor and Hamilton, 2005) . This allows us to find subsets of firms around the investmentgrade cutoff that are similar in terms of observable characteristics and expected default rates.
Second, the investment-grade label-a salient feature of contracts and regulations-restricts important investors from holding noninvestment-grade ("high-yield") debt. Consequently, when high-yield mutual funds experience withdrawals, other suppliers of capital are unable to step in (Duffie and Strulovici, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2007) , and noninvestment-grade firms experience a negative shock to the cost and availability of debt (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010) .
Our identification strategy compares the disclosure choices of noninvestment-grade (BB+) firms to a matched control sample of investment-grade (BBB-) over the period from 1996 until 2010, as a function of high-yield bond mutual fund flows. Given the supply of debt capital to BB+ firms will be affected by flows (but not BBB-firms), we are able to isolate the causal impact of financial constraints on the disclosure of BB+ firms, under the assumption that matched firms close to the investment cutoff experience similar unobservable shocks.
Using the incidence of managerial earnings guidance as our main measure of voluntary disclosure, 2 our analysis delivers two main results. First, we find that BB+ firms' voluntary disclosure choices respond to shocks to the supply of debt capital from high-yield bond mutual funds. There is no such adjustment among BBB-firms. Importantly, we find this effect to be asymmetric: BB+ firms only voluntarily disclose more information in response to fund outflows. 3 In terms of economic magnitudes, our baseline estimates imply that switching from a period of nonnegative to negative fund flows leads to an increase in the frequency of earnings guidance among BB+ firms that constitutes one-third of its standard deviation. This finding is consistent with our main hypothesis that noninvestment-grade firms, with limited access to bond finance, increase disclosure to offset some of the negative effects of debt capital supply shocks on investment (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012) .
Second, to investigate the mechanism underlying this result, we examine changes in 2 Earnings forecasts provided by managers has pricing implications in both equity and bond markets indicating they are informative about expected cash flows (e.g., Baginski and Rakow Jr, 2012; Shivakumar et al., 2011) . Consistent with lowering information asymmetry, forecasts reduce bid-ask spreads (Balakrishnan et al., 2014) and analyst forecast errors (Clement et al., 2003) .
3 The negative market reaction to guidance cessation may deter firms from reducing disclosure in response to high-yield bond fund inflows, since firms that stop providing guidance tend to have poor prior performance (Chen et al., 2011; Houston et al., 2010) .
financing following high-yield fund outflows and how this interacts with disclosure. Since noninvestment-grade firms subject to outflows will be unable to easily substitute bond financing, there may be benefits of disclosure to the extent that transparency reduces information problems and improves access to alternate sources of capital. Indeed, additional disclosure may benefit equity investors by reducing information acquisition costs and therefore facilitating monitoring of managers (Bird and Karolyi, 2015; Boone and White, 2015; Easley and O'Hara, 2004) , although this could be at the expense of other stakeholders with a private information advantage such as banks or other institutional investors (Armstrong et al., 2012; Vashishtha, 2014) . 4 We hypothesize that BB+ firms increase disclosure to cater to securities analysts and institutional investors to improve access to equity finance. In support of this hypothesis, we uncover an increase equity issuance among BB+ firms stepping up voluntary disclosure in response to high-yield fund outflows, consistent with a substitution effect from a bond to an equity investor base.
We perform several robustness tests to confirm the validity of our main results. We find these disclosure effects are only present among the set of BB+ firms most likely to be exante financially constrained. This strengthens the interpretation that voluntary disclosure alleviates financing constraints. We find larger magnitudes when we examine periods of stronger high-yield fund outflows-times when we expect debt financing constraints to bind.
We exclude periods characterized by large swings in high-yield mutual fund flows and show our results are not driven by these extreme events. This indicates that the adjustments in the disclosure behavior of BB+ firms are the result of ongoing shocks to access to financing. We also show our results are robust to the inclusion of several macroeconomic control variables, and are thus unlikely to reflect a greater responsiveness of lower-rated firms to recessions.
We also conduct two falsification tests. First, we include investment-grade mutual fund flows as an independent variable and show neither BBB-nor BB+ firms respond to investmentgrade fund flows. Second, we repeat our analysis at other ratings thresholds and find no differential effects. This final test gives us confidence that our results are not driven by unobservable characteristics used in credit ratings assignment that may be proxied for by high-yield mutual fund fund flows.
Overall, we provide robust evidence that negative shocks to high-yield mutual funds' capital supply induce increases in the disclosure of firms just below the investment-grade cutoff relative to the disclosure of similar firms just above. Our evidence suggests that firms with limited access to the high-yield bond market are able to substitute to alternative sources of funding by increasing disclosure and providing more information to investors.
While this substitution is unlikely to offset the negative effects of high-yield fund outflows for all BB+ firms-after all, Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) show the typical BB+ firm reduces investment-it may help some firms smooth out temporary shocks to the cost and availability of bond finance.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on the relation between disclosure policies and financing frictions. By allowing investors to more accurately estimate cash flows, financial disclosures reduce uncertainty and are therefore relevant for debt availability (Sufi, 2007) , pricing (Bharath et al., 2008; Duffie and Lando, 2001) , and secondary market liquidity (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008) , as well as the cost of equity finance (Francis et al., 2005 (Francis et al., , 2004 Kumar et al., 2008; Lee and Masulis, 2009) . Increased disclosure also appears to have positive effects around major corporate events, for example, when firms tap equity markets (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 2000) or change payout policy (Brockman et al., 2008; Grullon et al., 2002) . Within this literature, our paper is closely related to Lo (2014) , who uses the emerging-market financial crises in the late 1990s as a negative shock to certain U.S. banks' balance-sheets and loan supply, and finds that the borrowers of affected banks increase disclosure. Lo (2014) suggests these firms did so to substitute to alternative, po-tentially market-driven sources of financing. Our paper departs from this work in at least three important ways. First, rather than studying an event affecting banks and loan supply, we demonstrate how the availability of market-based bond finance from an important and predominantly retail class of investors interacts with market segmentation to affect disclosure practices. Second, we examine the importance of periodic shocks to capital supply that are distributed over time and both positive and negative-as opposed to a singular and extreme negative event-allowing us to document an asymmetric effect of financing constraints on disclosure. Third, we provide concrete evidence on how increased disclosure allows constrained firms to substitute from bond to equity finance.
We also contribute to the literature on investors' demand for corporate disclosure. Boone and White (2015) show that firms with higher institutional equity ownership provide greater disclosure (see also, Bird and Karolyi, 2015) . They argue that managers cater to institutional investors' informational preferences, which derives from lower trading and monitoring costs associated with greater transparency (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O'Hara, 2004) . In contrast, Vashishtha (2014) finds that firms reduce disclosure after violating covenants in syndicated bank loans. He argues that the decline in disclosure reflects lower information demands for monitoring purposes by shareholders, since bank monitoring is expected to play a bigger role in the wake of the violation. Our contribution is to study the interaction of the availability of public debt financing and shareholders' demand for public disclosures. We provide direct evidence that managers voluntarily increase disclosure to satisfy shareholders and, in doing so, successfully attract equity financing.
Finally, our approach relates to recent work that tackles endogeneity problems to make credible inferences regarding the determinants of corporate disclosure and firms' information environments. Focusing on an exogenous loss of public information due to reductions in analyst coverage, Balakrishnan et al. (2014) find managers respond by increasing voluntary disclosure in an effort to communicate with retail investors. Boone and White (2015) and Bird and Karolyi (2015) examine discontinuous changes in institutional ownership around reconstitutions of the Russell indices and provide evidence that disclosure quantity, form, and quality all adjust. We extend these studies by identifying shocks to debt capital supply unrelated to firms' fundamentals that are induced by the interaction of high-yield bond mutual fund flows and credit-ratings based capital market segmentation. In the spirit of a regression discontinuity design, we construct a matching estimator that yields the first causal estimate of the impact of bond financing shocks on corporate disclosure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the empirical methodology.
Section 3 describes our main results and sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Empirical Methodology

Identification Strategy
Changes in high-yield fund flows may impact access to debt capital for noninvestmentgrade firms. To investigate the effects on the disclosure decisions of these firms, we adapt the empirical methodology of Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) .
This identification strategy builds on two well-established facts related to credit ratingsbased capital market segmentation. First, many important classes of investors are restricted from holding noninvestment-grade debt securities. These restrictions arise from regulations:
commercial banks have been banned from holding debt securities rated below BBB-since 1936 (Harold, 1938) ; insurance companies face higher risk-based capital charges and portfolio limits of 20 percent on noninvestment-grade bonds (Ellul et al., 2011 (Cantor and Hamilton, 2005) . Credit ratings tend to be slow-moving because agencies dislike volatility; that is, agencies are hesitant to change firms' ratings if the decision has to be reversed in the near future (Altman and Kao, 1992; Cantor and Mann, 2006) . Moreover, agencies understand how their decisions affect market participants' willingness to hold certain bonds and the stability of ratings is therefore especially prominent around the investment-grade cutoff. As a consequence, there are subsets of investment-and noninvestment-grade firms that are similar in terms of fundamentals, i.e., observable characteristics and default rates.
Our empirical approach incorporates these two facts into a matching estimator (e.g., Abadie and Imbens, 2006) . We match firms in close proximity to the investment-grade cutoff (BBB-and BB+ rated firms) based on firm and industry characteristics. Then we compare how the disclosure policies of the matched firms respond to high-yield bond mutual fund flows, which is our proxy for the availability of debt financing for noninvestment-grade firms.
We utilize a nearest-neighbor matching procedure, which we implement as follows. For each quarter and each BB+ rated firm, we find a BBB-firm that is nearest in terms of our matching variables. We match on the basis of the following firm fundamentals: size, Q, leverage, cash holdings, and measures of profitability (return-on-assets, ROA, and a negative earnings indicator variable). 5 We measure the distance between firms based on the Mahalanobis metric. Under this metric, the distance between matching variables incorporates information on both the variances of and covariances between these variables. To ensure high quality matches, we require the difference in each matching variable to be within one standard deviation.
To illustrate how our empirical approach works, let firm i have true, unobservable credit quality X i and observed credit rating R i . For simplicity, define HY Fund Outflows t−1 to be an indicator variable equal to one if there were high-yield bond mutual fund outflows in the previous period, and zero otherwise. Then we may write the voluntary disclosure policy of firm i as a function of outflows as:
under the following assumptions: first, that unobservable common shocks, µ t , depend on the true credit quality (X i ); second, individual firms are too small for idiosyncratic shocks ( it ) to be correlated with high-yield fund outflows; third, the dependence of disclosure on outflows,
, is a function of the observed credit rating. This latter assumption follows naturally from the aforementioned institutional frictions, which may impact firms' disclosure policies through access to debt financing. If our matched BBB-firm is sufficiently close-that is, a firm j with underlying credit quality and common shock such that µ t (X i ) = µ t (X j )-then differencing (1) across firms i and j gives:
where ∆Vol. Disclosure it is the difference in voluntary disclosure between matched BB+ and BBB-firms. Thus, differencing out the disclosure behavior of matched firms eliminates the correlation between the unobservable common shock and fund outflows, allowing us to identify the effect of high-yield fund flows on voluntary disclosure.
The coefficient of interest in (2) is β, which measures the differential sensitivity of noninvestment-grade firms' voluntary disclosure to high-yield bond mutual fund outflows.
If firms increase disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and maintain access to capital markets, the coefficient β will be strictly positive. The null hypothesis is that high-yield fund outflows are irrelevant for noninvestment-grade firms' disclosure (because these firms can find substitute financing or disclosure does not depend on access to finance), which corresponds to expecting that β will be zero.
Our identifying assumption is that firms just above and below the investment-grade cutoff experience similar unobservable shocks. Under this assumption, the sensitivity of noninvestment-grade firms' disclosure to high-yield fund flows indicates that funding shocks and capital market segmentation matter for corporate disclosure. Our empirical approach ensures this assumption holds, however, it is subject to two important critiques. The first is that our matched firms may not experience similar unobservable shocks. A separate concern is that firms may manage credit ratings based on unobservable characteristics. While we cannot rule out either concern, we now discuss the nature of the potential bias for β and how our robustness tests alleviate these concerns.
While we show our matching procedure successfully finds similar pairs of firms in terms of observable characteristics, firms may still differ on the basis of unobservables. If these unobservables are both used to assign credit ratings and determine shocks to disclosure then our results may be biased. In this case, high-yield fund flows may proxy for differential shocks to noninvestment-grade firms. We use two robustness tests to address this concern.
First, we analyze other ratings cutoffs and compare the responsiveness of disclosure to fund outflows. For example, we compare if the disclosure of BB+ rated firms is more responsive to high-yield mutual fund flows than he disclosure of BB rated firms. If unobservables are used to assign credit ratings, then differences in disclosure behavior should be present around other ratings cutoffs. Second, we control for macroeconomic variables in our regressions to show that our estimate of β is unlikely to simply pickup differences in behavior through the business cycle between creditworthy and less creditworthy firms.
A remaining concern is that firms could be managing their credit ratings. This could be because firms select into different ratings, possibly, on the basis of unobservables. We believe it is plausible that firms with a greater reliance on unstable high-yield fund flows may have stronger incentives to obtain a BBB-rating. Under this assumption, the realized set of BB+ firms should display a lower responsiveness of disclosure to high-yield fund flows.
However, under this plausible selection scenario we should expect our estimate of β to be biased towards zero. Alternatively, when BBB-firms fear downgrades they might have particularly strong incentives to alter their behavior-including disclosure-in order to keep their investment-grade status. While plausible, in order to threaten our identification, such downgrades would have to positively correlate with high-yield fund flows. However, in the data downgrades and high-yield fund flows negatively correlate. Thus, bias arising from firms managing existing ratings would also attenuate our estimate of β.
Sample Selection and Variable Construction
Our sample consists of U.S. firm-quarter level data from Standard and Poor's (S&P)
Compustat for the period from 1986:Q1 until 2010:Q4. The unit of observation in our analysis is always a firm-quarter. Our choice of sample period reflects the availability of domestic long-term issuer credit ratings provided by S&P. We drop firms operating in the financial, insurance, real estate industries (SIC 60-69), and utilities (SIC 49). We use these data to construct measures of size, Q, leverage, cash holdings, and earnings (return-on-assets, ROA, and a negative earnings indicator variable), which are used in our matching scheme. These variables are standard and defined precisely in the Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level to ensure that results are robust to outliers.
Our main dependent variable is voluntary corporate disclosure, which we measure using earnings guidance as issued by management. A large literature has used management-issued earnings forecasts to measure voluntary disclosure (Armstrong et al., 2014) . The voluntary disclosure literature has demonstrated that this form of communication is perceived as credible and informative by the market (Rogers and Stocken, 2005) . In particular, it is associated with analysts' own earnings forecast revisions (Lang and Lundholm, 1996) , as well as changes in stock prices and trading activity (Balakrishnan et al., 2014) . Moreover, improvements in firm-level transparency have been attributed to earnings forecasts issued by management, especially when such forecasts occur frequently and with accuracy (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Skinner, 1994 ).
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We extract firm level earnings guidance data from the Company Issued Guidelines of the Thomson Reuters' First Call Historical Database. For each firm-quarter, we count the number of forecasts and pre-announcements of earnings per share provided by management for the firms common shares. Precisely, in a given quarter, we record a voluntary disclosure event if management provides earnings guidance before the end of a fiscal period or after the end of a fiscal period but before the actual earnings announcement. If there is no guidance event in a given firm-quarter, then we assume the firm is a non-discloser in that period.
To measure firms' access to bond markets, we use the senior secured credit rating. This is usually the highest rating a firm can obtain on a new debt issuance. Firms with BB+ senior secured ratings will be unable to issue investment-grade debt when noninvestmentgrade debt funding is limited. Compustat provides long-term issuer credit ratings assigned to firms by S&P, which proxy for the senior secured rating. The ICI also provide data on investment-grade fund flows that we use in robustness tests.
We use this flows data to construct measures of high-yield bond fund flows, which we use as independent variables in our regressions. We first scale flows in each quarter by the capital (measured by plants, property, and equipment, PPE) of investment-and noninvestmentgrade firms close to the ratings cutoff (firms rated between BBB+ and BB-) to capture their economic importance. We then cumulate flows from quarters t − 4 until t − 1 to allow for a time lag between fund flows and changes in firm behavior, such as bond issuance. Figure 1 indicates that high-yield fund flows vary considerably over time and are large in magnitude when compared to the PPE of firms around the investment-grade ratings cutoff. In addition to using scaled high-yield bond mutual flows as an independent variable in our tests, we also consider an indicator variable equal to one if there were cumulative fund outflows from quarters t − 4 until t − 1, and zero otherwise. we can see from the lack of differences in observable characteristics. Matched BB+ and BBB-firms are essentially the same in terms of size and leverage, in contrast to the large differences observed in the full sample. The remaining differences are neither statistically nor economically significant, including Q and the measures of profitability. This reassures us that our matching estimator will adequately control for differences in firms around the investment-grade cutoff, at least in terms of fundamentals such as size, leverage, and performance.
Summary Statistics
Empirical Results
This section provides estimates of the impact of high-yield bond mutual fund flows on the voluntary disclosure decisions of corporations. In Section 3.1.1, we conduct the baseline firm-level analysis, as well as falsification and robustness tests. In Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3
we show our results are robust when we control for business cycle effects and use alternative measures of flows, respectively. In Section 3.2, we examine how the relation between fund flows and disclosure varies with measures of firm-level financial constraints. Section 3.3
investigates whether additional disclosures relate to equity issuance behavior.
High-Yield Fund Flows and Corporate Disclosure 3.1.1 Baseline Analysis
We begin by estimating the relation between voluntary disclosure and high-yield mutual fund flows based on equation (2). We regress the difference in disclosure of matched BB+ and BBB-firms on flows using ordinary least squares (OLS):
where i indexes firms, t indexes quarters, k indexes years, and j indexes industries. The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. The dependent variable, ∆Vol. Disclosure it , is the difference in voluntary disclosure between matched BB+ and BBB-firms. The main independent variable, HY Fund Outflows t−1 , is an indicator variable equal to one if there were cumulative outflows from high-yield funds over the previous four quarters. The α k and α j denote year and industry (based on 48 Fama-French industries) fixed effects, respectively. The industry fixed effects control for time-invariant differences between industries and the year fixed effects control for aggregate economic shocks at the annual frequency. it is the error term, which is assumed to be correlated within firm and potentially heteroskedastic (Petersen, 2009) . Table II shows the baseline regression results. Column [1] shows the results from the estimation of (3). The coefficient on high-yield fund outflows is equal to 0.156 and significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The direction of this estimate is consistent with noninvestment-grade firms increasing disclosure more relative to investment-grade firms when the pool of funds available to high-yield mutual funds declines. This effect is large in terms of economic magnitudes: the estimate implies that switching from a period of nonnegative to negative fund flows leads to 0.156 increase in the frequency of earnings guidance among BB+ firms, which constitutes about one-third of its standard deviation (0.470). This finding is consistent with economic models of capital structure, information asymmetry, and corporate disclosure behavior (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001) . In such models, information released by firms can mitigate the potentially large financing costs associated with information asymmetry. In our context, a lower availability of funds from a key provider of capital increases the potential benefits of information disclosure, and noninvestment-grade firms respond ac-cordingly.
We next consider a key auxiliary test that will give us further confidence in our identification strategy. We check whether the effects on disclosure are more pronounced for periods of large high-yield fund outflows. It is natural to expect that noninvestment-grade firms increase disclosure more strongly in response to severe outflows, since access to debt capital will be most limited in such periods. To test this idea, we define a quarter to have "Strong" outflows when high-yield fund outflows are above-median and "Weak" otherwise.
We re-estimate equation (3) replacing our main independent variable with two interaction terms:
We therefore allow for a differential sensitivity of disclosure among noninvestment-grade firms in response to fund outflows of different magnitudes, as measured by the difference between β 1 and β 2 . Thus, our baseline results are not driven by these severe episodes. Instead, the adjustments in the disclosure behavior of noninvestment-grade firms are the result of ongoing shocks to access to debt financing.
We continue to examine the robustness of the baseline estimates in Table III .
Our matching procedure only allows for BBB-and BB+ firms to enter the estimation.
This allows us to estimate the effect of high-yield fund flows in the spirit of a sharp regression discontinuity design. We now investigate whether our results change when we include additional firms around the investment-grade cutoff. In particular, we adopt a wider bandwidth, including firms rated BBB+, BBB, or BBB-in the investment-grade and firms rated BB+, BB, or BB-in the noninvestment-grade groups, and repeat our baseline estimation of equation (3). Column [1] of Table III shows the coefficient on high-yield fund flows attenuates when we use a wider bandwidth and larger sample of firm-quarters: the estimate of β reduces from 0.156 to 0.096. This is most likely due to our matching procedure becoming less effective and differences in unobservable and observable firm characteristics playing a bigger role.
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One remaining concern is our estimates may be affected by unobservable firm characteristics known by the ratings agency and used in ratings assignments. As a consequence, BB+ firms may differ from their BBB-matches along unobservable dimensions correlated with both high-yield fund flows and disclosure behavior. To address this issue, we conduct falsification tests using matched firms around other close by rating cutoffs to check if lowerrated firms' disclosure around other rating cutoffs is more responsive to fund flows relative to higher-rated firms. We use our baseline matching procedure and compare firms rated BBBwith firms rated BBB and firms rated BB with firms rated BB+, i.e., one notch above and one notch below.
Columns [2] and [3] present the results from alternative cutoffs. We find that there is no differential sensitivity of disclosure to high-yield mutual fund flows for lower-rated firms at either cutoff. This suggests that our main results do not reflect differences in unobservable characteristics used in credit ratings assignment. However, it is important to note that unobservable information might only be relevant at the investment-grade cutoff. While these falsification tests do not eliminate this possibility, our tests in coming sections alleviate this concern.
In our baseline tests, we use an indicator variable to measure the extensive margin change 8 What does the matched sample look like here? Show this in an appendix?
in voluntary disclosure by firms in response to high-yield fund flows. We now consider an alternative, intensive margin measure of voluntary disclosure based on the number of earnings forecasts issued by management in the current quarter. Such a measure might be informative, especially if the decision to start or stop guiding is particularly costly (Chen et al., 2011) .
Column [4] shows the result of re-estimating our baseline regression model (3) now using the difference in the number of earnings forecasts between BB+ and matched BBB-firms as the dependent variable. The coefficient on high-yield fund outflows is equal to 0.287 and significant at the 5 percent confidence level. In terms of economic magnitudes, the estimate implies that switching from a period of nonnegative to negative fund flows leads to 0.287 additional earnings forecasts in the current quarter among BB+ firms. This effect is large and constitutes about 35 percent of its standard deviation (0.820).
To summarize, we document the corporate disclosure effects of changes in the financing capacity resulting from capital market segmentation. Our results in Tables II and III indicate an economically meaningful and statistically significant impact of high-yield fund flows on the voluntary disclosure of BB+ firms as compared to similar firms with a BBB-rating.
These findings are consistent with theoretical research emphasizing a link between disclosure, information asymmetry, and the cost of capital (Lambert et al., 2007; Verrecchia, 2001 ).
They also confirm findings in recent empirical work that connects measures of transparency with the cost of debt and equity finance (e.g., Bharath et al., 2008; Lee and Masulis, 2009 ).
Controlling for Business Cycle Effects
In this section, we investigate the alternative hypothesis that the behavior of less creditworthy firms is more responsive to the business cycle and that high-yield mutual fund flows are proxying for this greater responsiveness.
We use two approaches to address this concern. First, note that we have already shown our main results are robust to dropping the two most recent recessions from our sample. Here, we use a complementary approach which is to include several macroeconomic indicators in our baseline regression model. The macroeconomic variables are each included individually or we simultaneously control for them all at once. We measure these variables with a onequarter lag, i.e., contemporaneously with the high-yield mutual fund flows. In each column, we find the coefficient on high-yield fund outflows is positive and statistically significant at at least the 10 percent level. Moreover, the size of the coefficient on flows is stable across all specifications and similar to the baseline estimate in column [1] of Table II . Thus, it seems unlikely that the greater responsiveness of BB+ firms' disclosure to high-yield fund outflows simply reflects differences in disclosure behavior over the business cycle.
Alternative Measurement of Fund Flows
In this section, we examine whether our results are robust to an alternative construction of high-yield fund flows.
The main independent variable in our baseline analysis is an indicator variable that identifies periods of fund outflows from the high-yield bond market. As an alternative, we consider a continuous measure of flows equal to the dollar value of flows cumulated from quarters t − 4 until t − 1 and scaled by the PPE of firms rated between BBB+ and BB-(see Figure 1 ). This captures both inflows and outflows, as well as their economic importance relative to the capital of investment-and noninvestment-grade firms close to the ratings cutoff. We incorporate this alternative measure of flows into our main estimating equation (3) and repeat the estimation for our baseline matched sample. Table V shows the results.
Column [1] performs the baseline estimation with the continuous measure of flows as the main independent variable. The point estimate has the expected sign (-3.882), but is statistically insignificant. This suggests that noninvestment-grade firms' disclosure is not more sensitive than that of investment-grade firms when high-yield mutual fund flows increase or decrease. An alternative interpretation is that there is an asymmetric effect on disclosure and firms are less responsive to positive shocks to the supply of capital. Theoretically, information problems usually bind on the lower side (Verrecchia, 2001) . Moreover, recent empirical work uncovers a large negative stock market reaction to stopping giving earnings guidance (Chen et al., 2011; Houston et al., 2010) . Thus, it is more likely for firms to increase disclosure when faced with a negative shock than reduce disclosure when faced with a positive shock. between the coefficients on the two interaction terms: the coefficient on fund inflows is statistically indistinguishable from zero and the coefficient on fund outflows is negative (-18.031 ) and significant at the 1 percent confidence level. This provides clear evidence that noninvestment-grade firms respond only to negative shocks to debt capital supply through an increase in disclosure, but not to positive shocks. Column [3] goes one step further and breaks out the high-yield fund outflows into quarters where cumulative flows are above-and belowmedian, which we label "Strong" and "Weak" respectively. We find that noninvestmentgrade firms' information disclosure response is concentrated in quarters where the outflows are particularly strong, which is when debt financing constraints are likely to be tightest.
Columns [4] to [6] repeat three robustness tests from Table II . First, we include investmentgrade fund flows and show the coefficient on high-yield fund outflows is unchanged both in terms of size and significance. This suggest that neither investment-nor noninvestmentgrade firms to respond to investment-grade fund flows. Next, we exclude the two most recent recessions from the sample in turn and repeat the estimation on the smaller sample.
In both cases the main result is robust, which indicates it is not driven by one-off swings in fund flows but instead reflects recurrent negative shocks to capital. Moreover, last finding suggests the high-yield fund outflows variable is not merely picking up a greater sensitivity of noninvestment-grade firms' disclosure to recessions.
Role of Ex-Ante Financial Constraints
In this section, we examine whether ex-ante financially constrained firms-those firms with access to few alternative sources of funding-adjust their corporate disclosure more in response to high-yield fund outflows.
Theory predicts that information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside investors can give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984) , which may negatively impact access to external funding and, ultimately, investment.
Our central hypothesis is that corporate disclosure can alleviate such information-related financing frictions, so that more transparent firms will have greater access to market-based financing (Lambert et al., 2007; Verrecchia, 2001 ). In our context, in the presence of information-based financing frictions the choice of internal versus external funding (e.g., debt versus equity) will depend upon relative cost of each of these sources of capital. In periods when debt capital from high-yield bond mutual funds is scarce, the cost of accessing bond funding increases both in absolute terms and relative to other sources. Noninvestmentgrade firms, with limited access to internal funds or other capital markets, may therefore increase disclosure to offset some of the negative effects of high-yield fund outflows on investment (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012) . Since these firms will be unable to easily substitute funding, there will be relatively large benefits of disclosure and transparency in terms improving access to outside sources of capital. In particular, such firms may increase disclosure to cater to securities analysts and institutional investors to improve their access to equity capital (Bird and Karolyi, 2015; Boone and White, 2015) .
These arguments suggest that the increases in voluntary disclosure in response to highyield fund outflows will be concentrated among the constrained subset of noninvestmentgrade firms. We examine this hypothesis based on three measures of ex-ante financial constraints commonly used in the empirical corporate finance literature (e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2015) . First, we consider the KZ index of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . The KZindex loads negatively on cash flow, cash holdings, and dividends, and positively on leverage and Q. Second, the WW-index of Whited and Wu (2006) , which captures the shadow value of capital. Finally, the SA-index of Hadlock and Pierce (2010) , which is a simple combination of size and age. 9 By construction, these indexes are higher for firms that are financially more constrained. For each measure, we therefore partition the set of BB+ firm-quarters and their matched BBB-pair according to whether they are above (constrained) or below (unconstrained) the median value among the set of BB+ firms. We then re-estimate equation (3) separately on the groups of financially constrained and unconstrained matched BB+ firms.
10 Table VI reports the results. The point estimates indicate that there are substantial differences in the responsiveness of corporate disclosure to high-yield fund outflows between the constrained and unconstrained groups. In particular, the size of the coefficient of interest, β, is estimated to be large and statistically significant for the constrained group for all three measures. Furthermore, the point estimate is between 50 to 100 percent larger in magnitude than the corresponding estimate for the full sample (see column [1] of Table II ). In contrast, the sensitivity to flows for the unconstrained subgroup of noninvestment-grade firms is always statistically indistinguishable from zero. This finding suggests that financially constrained noninvestment-grade firms increase information disclosure in response to high-yield fund outflows.
To summarize, we find that the differential sensitivity of corporate disclosure to flows into high-yield mutual funds is more pronounced among ex-ante financially constrained firms. We observe no adjustment in information disclosure behavior among financially unconstrained firms. Our interpretation is that noninvestment-grade firms with a limited ability to substitute away from the high-yield bond financing increase disclosure to accommodate investors zation; debt/(debt + equity) is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus stockholders equity; and dividends are dividends on common stocks plus dividends on preferred stocks. We compute the WW-index as follows: WW-index = -0.091 × cash flow/assets -0.062 × positive dividend + 0.021 × long-term debt/assets -0.044 × log(assets) + 0.102 × industry sales growth -0.035 × sales growth, where: positive dividend is an indicator variable equal to one if cash dividend is positive; and industry sales growth is sales growth in the firm's three-digit SIC industry. The SA-index is calculated as: -0.737 × assets + 0.043 × assets 2 -0.040 × age. 10 Similar results obtain regardless of whether we use contemporaneous or lagged measures of financial constraints. The use of lagged values mitigates concerns that the classification might be contaminated by contemporaneous high-yield fund flows.
and improve access to alternative sources of financing. In the next section, we show that additional equity issuance is a plausible channel through which noninvestment-grade firms' disclosures achieve this outcome.
Flows, Corporate Disclosure, and Equity Issuance
Under the assumption that additional managerial disclosures alleviate information-based financing frictions (Diamond, 1985; Lambert et al., 2007; Verrecchia, 2001) , reducing information asymmetry through credible voluntary disclosure may allow noninvestment-grade firms to raise equity at lower financing costs (Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Myers and Majluf, 1984) . In this section, we examine the financing effects of the change in disclosure among noninvestment-grade firms and find evidence consistent with this channel: firms increasing voluntary disclosure in response to high-yield fund outflows increase equity issuance.
We estimate the relation between high-yield mutual fund flows, voluntary disclosure, and equity issuance based using a slight modification of our baseline empirical methodology. In particular, for our matched sample of BB+ and BBB-firms, we regress the difference in equity issuance on flows via OLS:
where i indexes firms, t indexes quarters, k indexes years, and j indexes industries. The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. The dependent variable, ∆Equity Issuance it , is the difference in common equity scaled by (lagged) total assets between matched BB+ and BBB-firms. The main independent variable, HY Fund Outflows t−1 , is now interacted with variables indicating whether firm i provided disclosure or not in quarter t.
The coefficients of interest in (5), β 1 and β 2 , capture the differential sensitivity of the equity issuance of noninvestment-grade firms that do and do not provide additional disclosures to high-yield bond mutual fund outflows. If firms increase disclosure to reduce information asymmetry-and this has a meaningful impact on equity issuance-then β 1 will be strictly positive and greater than β 2 . The null hypothesis is that high-yield fund outflows are irrelevant for noninvestment-grade firms' equity issuance behavior, which corresponds to β 1 and β 2 equal to zero. (5) that only includes the high-yield bond fund outflows main effect on the full matched sample. The point estimate indicates noninvestment-grade firms' equity issuance is more responsive to high-yield fund outflows than investment-grade firms' issuance. In column [2], we break out this average effect and allow for a differential sensitivity of equity issuance to fund outflows for noninvestment-grade firms that increase disclosure versus those that do not. We find a positive effect of high-yield fund outflows on equity issuance only for firms increasing disclosure. In particular, the estimate of β 1 is positive (0.032) and statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level. In contrast, β 2 is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In line with the theory, this suggests that noninvestment-grade firms providing more information to investors are able to substitute from the high-yield bond market to equity financing. The remaining columns of To summarize, the results of this section suggest that increased disclosure plays an important role in allowing noninvestment-grade firms to maintain access to finance when funding through the high-yield bond financing becomes limited.
Conclusion
We provide evidence that binding financial constraints lead managers to increase voluntary disclosure. Our tests exploit the sharp distinction between investment-and noninvestmentgrade firms that exposes them to variation in access to debt financing unrelated to firm fundamentals. This market segmentation allows us to measure how shocks to high-yield mutual funds cause the voluntary disclosure of BB+ firms to diverge from the disclosure of BBBfirms in close proximity to the investment-grade cutoff.
We have two main results. First, we show that firms respond to negative shocks to their supply of debt capital by voluntarily disclosing more information. Further analysis indicates that this effect is concentrated in periods of strong high-yield bond fund ouflows and among firms that are most likely to be financially constrained ex-ante. We find no such effects around other ratings cutoffs nor do we find firms decrease disclosures in response to highyield fund inflows. This latter effect is consistent with an asymmetric effect of shocks to the supply of capital on corporate disclosure with firms less responsive on the positive side.
Second, we document an increase in equity issuance among noninvestment-grade firms stepping up voluntary disclosure in response to high-yield fund outflows. This suggests that firms with limited access to the high-yield bond market are able to reduce information asymmetry and substitute to alternative sources of funding. While this substitution is unlikely to offset the negative effects of high-yield fund outflows- Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) show the typical noninvestment-grade firm reduces investment-it may help noninvestment-grade firms smooth out temporary shocks to the cost and availability of debt finance.
Overall, our work supports theoretical research on the impact of disclosure on corporate policies that explicitly assumes that reporting practices and, consequently, the information environment of the firm are endogenously determined (e.g., Lambert et al., 2007; Verrecchia, 2001 ). Variable:
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